that participants evaluated the target as more responsible for the course of the story than the sources, F(1, 117) = 68.36, p < .001, η 2 = .37. Moreover, there was a significant main effect of ostracism showing that participants attributed more responsibility to both targets and sources alike in the exclusion compared to the inclusion condition, F(1,117) = 7.98, p = .006, η 2 = .06. Neither target behavior, F(1, 117) = 1.91, p = .169, η 2 = .02, nor any of the interactions had a significant effect on the attribution of responsibility, largest F(1, 117) = 1.84, p = .169, η 2 = .02. Finally, when the target acted in line with the social norm, there was neither a significant main effect of the person, F < 1, η 2 =.00, or ostracism, F(1, 52) = 1.58, p = .214, η 2 =.03, but a significant person x ostracism interaction, F(1, 52) = 6.07, p = .017, η 2 =.10.
Looking at the simple main effects, there was no significant difference between target and sources in both exclusion and control group, F(1, 52) = 3.18, p = .080, η 2 =.06 and F(1, 52) = 2.91, p = .094, η 2 =.05, with a tendency of the target being seen as more responsible in the control group and the sources in the exclusion group. To break down the three-way interaction, we ran the analysis separately for the target behavior conditions: When the target had acted norm-consistently, there were no significant differences in the attribution of responsibility, all F < 1. When the target had violated the social norm, there was a significant main effect of the person, Wilks' λ = .575, F(2, 99) = 36.57, p < .001, η 2 =.43, that was qualified by the significant person x ostracism two-way interaction, Wilks' λ = .878, F(2, 99) = 6.86, p = .002, η 2 =.12. The main effect of ostracism was not significant, F < 1, η 2 = .00. Looking at the simple main effects, the target was generally seen as more responsible than the sources, however, the effect was larger in the exclusion group, Wilks' λ = .582, F(2, 99) = 35.57, p < .001, η 2 =.42, than in the inclusion group, Wilks' λ = .871, F(2, 99) = 7.30, p = .001, η 2 =.13. 
Realism
In Study 3, participants were asked how realistic they felt the behavior of the three players was as well as their willingness to cooperate (1= very unrealistic, 7 = very realistic) . Note. Means (and standard deviations) as a function of the four experimental conditions. The letters a -d represent significant differences between groups; all values in the same row that share the same letter do not differ significantly from each other, values with different letters do.
Study 4 Realism
In Study 4, participants were asked how realistic they felt the behavior of the three players was as well as their willingness to cooperate (1= very unrealistic, 7 = very realistic) . 
Serial Mediation
We originally assumed and consequently pre-registered a serial mediation analysis, assuming that participants first make a moral judgement about how fairly the target and sources have acted within the situation, which should subsequently affect their evaluation of the targets and the sources, and eventually be associated with the severity of the sanctions they impose on them. We thus ran two serial mediation models with MPLUS (Muthén & Muthén, 1998 -2015 , 
